DI MARCO Q. SILVI
Abstract – When we talk about legal acts, we also refer to legal normative acts, i.e. legal speech acts under which we can create norms, normative objects and normative status. Moreover, two different viewpoints can be expressed about legal normative acts. The first typically applies when talking about bills of parliament, or decrees of Minister, or judicial sentences, or contracts, etc.: in these cases, we consider legal acts in relation to its “position” into a Stufenbau, i.e. in relation to a specific competent legal authority authorised to make norms in a legal system. The second point of view on legal acts, instead, typically applies when talking about orders, authorisations, exemptions, pardons, convictions, etc.: in these cases, we consider legal acts in relation to its specific illocutionary purpose and illocutionary content, i.e. aspects which are independent from norms on Stufenbau of a specific legal system. Within the perspective of legal dogmatics the two above viewpoints on the legal normative acts are not alternative, but complementary; according to the analytical philosophy of law, instead, preferring one of them is not a neutral methodological choice: only the second viewpoint in fact allows a real comprehension of legal normative acts.
Keywords – Legal Speech Acts, Metatheory of Legal Acts, Social Ontology, Legal System