Intelligenze artificiali e tutela dei diritti: le istanze ultra-riparatorie della persona umana.
DI MAURO FORTUNATO MAGNELLI
ABSTRACT – While being aware of the changing times and the dynamism that must characterize the work of the interpreter, it must be noted that algorithmic intelligences are not always able to evaluate the specific case, nor to substitute that individual and responsible elaboration, on a constitutional basis, to the sensitivity of the Judge, whose decision affects the reality of substantive relations and is functional to the protection of rights. In the area of civil liability – which more than others combines the dialogue between theory and practice -, for example, artificial intelligence systems do not seem to be able to provide an adequate response to claims from the person who has suffered a violation of fundamental rights (non pecuniary damages). These systems have no capacity to restore the equilibrium of the destabilized system in its basic principles. In this last circumstance, the role of the Judge remains crucial: having regard to the worthiness of interest that has been damaged and being inspired by adequacy, proportionality and reasonableness, the Judge has the task of quantifying the damage in the light of its perception of the facts, a perception which affects not only events, but the previous conditions of the subjects, their fragility, their way of representing and feeling the harmful events and all the consequences produced by these.
KEYWORDS – human person – civil justice – algorithms – tort – non pecuniary damage (quantification of damages)